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Unwired Planet v Huawei: A Seminal SEP/
FRAND decision from the UK
Peter Picht*
With its decision in Unwired Planet (UWP) v Huawei,
Birss J has not only handed down the first major ruling
on SEP/FRAND issues in England but also decided a
case that poses a number of key questions in this area of
the law. Well aware of this, he has drafted a thorough
and extensive opinion that is likely to have a consider-
able impact on the development of EU law and beyond.1
Inter alia, the decision discusses the legal nature of an
ETSI FRAND declaration; the question whether
“FRAND” is a range or a single set of licensing condi-
tions; the procedural component of FRAND; the exis-
tence of a qualified “unFRANDliness”-threshold below
which competition law is not triggered; the sequencing
of negotiation and litigation over FRAND licences;
hard-edged vs. soft-edged discrimination; the role of
“comparables” for calculating FRAND; and the anti-
competitiveness of offering a mixed portfolio of SEPs
and non-SEPs.
I. Facts of the case
The overall dispute at issue can be separated into – so far
– six trials. Three “technical” trials have been completed,
each dealing with one patent and relating to technical is-
sues such as validity, infringement and essentiality.
Another trial concerned the only non-SEP in the portfo-
lio. The non-technical trial constituting the subject-
matter of the present decision relates to competition law
as well as FRAND issues and involves patents which are
(allegedly) standard-essential patents (SEPs) according
to the ETSI IPR Policy. If necessary, there may be a fur-
ther trial dealing with additional questions including
“pass through licences”. When the lawsuit was brought,
claimants Unwired Planet Int. and Unwired Planet LLC
(hereinafter also: claimant/Unwired Planet/UWP) were
the proprietors of European patent EP 2 229 744 whose
standard-essential character has been confirmed; EP
2 119 287 and EP 2 485 514 which have been revoked; EP
1 230 818 whose standard-essential character has also
been confirmed; and EP 1 105 991 as well as EP 0 989 712
being the subject of two further trials.2 The results of the
first three technical trials are under appeal to the Court
of Appeal, but defendant Huawei’s first appeal, concern-
ing EP 2 229 744, has already been rejected.3 Further
technical trials were suspended. Unwired Planet’s busi-
ness model is the licensing of patents to companies who
make and sell telecommunications equipment such as
mobile phones and infrastructure. All these patents were
originally granted to Ericsson and are part of a patent
portfolio the claimant obtained from Ericsson, purport-
edly encompassing patents essential to various ICT
standards. The defendants in the overall dispute (in par-
ticular Huawei, Google and Samsung) produce and mar-
ket GSM, UMTS and LTE based devices.
In 2016, Unwired Planet LLC was acquired by
PanOptis, whereas Unwired Planet Inc. changed its name
to Great Elm Capital Group Inc. The claimant’s contacts
with the defendants started in October 2012 when it ap-
proached defendant Samsung. Under the cover of a Non-
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) claim charts for the SEPs
were provided on 17 December 2012 along with informa-
tion about previous litigation. Subsequently, two meet-
ings took place in May and August 2013. By October
2013, further meetings with Samsung were arranged. In
June 2013, the claimant also approached defendant
Huawei (hereinafter: defendant/Huawei), which informed
the claimant’s advisor Evercore by letter on 22 August
2013 that it was not willing to acquire Ericsson-derived
infrastructure patents. In subsequent letters dated 13
September 2013 and October 2013 addressed by the
claimant to Huawei’s board, the latter was invited to en-
ter into licensing negotiations and ultimately to reach an
agreement, but no licence was concluded. Huawei did
not deny having received the letters, but the claimant
made no effort to follow them up. On 25 November
2013, the claimant contacted the defendant’s IP
* Prof. Dr., LL.M. (Yale); Professor for Business and Commercial Law,
University of Zurich; Affiliated Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for
Innovation and Competition, Munich.
1 However, it is an interesting question what effect a potential abrogation
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inafter Unwired Planet v Huawei), para. 2.
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department which responded promptly. On 13 January
2014, the defendant Huawei asked the claimant for claim
charts which were produced on 16 January 2014 under
an NDA and included draft terms. On 29 January 2014,
Huawei proposed different NDA terms the receipt of
which was confirmed by the claimant on the same day.
Until 10 March 2014, when the litigation started, there
was no further contact between the parties. After the be-
ginning of the proceedings, in April 2014, the claimant
made an open offer to the defendants (“April 2014 of-
fer”) to license its entire global portfolio, including SEPs
and non-SEPs. The defendants refused to obtain a licence
because they contended, on the one hand, that the pat-
ents were not infringed, not essential or invalid and, on
the other hand, that the claimant’s licensing offer was not
FRAND. In addition, the defendants raised defences and
counterclaims based on violations of competition law. In
particular, they alleged a violation of Art. 101 TFEU re-
garding the Master Sale Agreement (MSA) through which
the claimant had acquired patents from Ericsson,4 as well
as a violation of Art. 102 TFEU (abuse of a dominant po-
sition).5 In July 2014, the claimant made a second offer
(“July 2014 offer”) limited to the SEPs in the portfolio,
which was also rejected by the defendants due to its non-
FRAND character. The royalty rates in the July 2014 offer
were global rates of 0.2% for 4G/LTE and 0.1% for other
standards, with the percentages relating to the average
selling price (ASP) for mobile devices and the revenue for
infrastructure. Moreover, the offer contained caps should
the royalty expressed as a share of the ASP exceed a pre-
defined level. Subsequent to directions of the Court in
June 2015, both sides submitted offers containing detailed
licensing terms.6 The claimant proposed a worldwide SEP
portfolio licence, a UK SEP portfolio licence and per-
patent licences for any SEPs the licensee may choose. The
royalties claimed for the per-patent licences or for a UK
portfolio licence were higher than the global rate on offer.
The defendant Huawei, in turn, submitted a proposal for
a per-patent licence limited to the UK SEPs, including
rates for all five SEPs together of 0.034% for LTE, 0.015%
for UMTS and zero for GSM.
In summer 2015, defendant Google settled and defen-
dant Samsung did the same in summer 2016.7 As a conse-
quence, Huawei discontinued a significant part of its
counterclaims and certain controversial terms – in partic-
ular the clause on applicable royalty rates – were removed
from the MSA. Since then, the litigation summarized here
has only involved Unwired Planet and Huawei.
In February 2016, the claimant and the defendant ex-
changed open correspondence concerning their lack of
progress in concluding a FRAND licence.8 In August
2016, the claimant made a new offer comprising the
same terms but lower rates. The global SEP portfolio
rate for 4G/LTE in this offer was 0.13%. The corre-
sponding rates for GSM /UMTS were 0.065%. For a
UK SEP portfolio licence the proposals were 0.42%
(LTE) or 0.21% (GSM/UMTS) for infrastructure and
0.55% (LTE) or 0.28% (GSM/UMTS) for mobile de-
vices. The defendant’s offer remained on a per-patent
basis, including proposed rates of 0.036% (LTE),
0.015% (UMTS) or zero (GSM) for infrastructure and
0.040% (LTE), 0.015% (UMTS) and zero (GSM) for
mobiles devices.9 On 11 October 2016, the defendant
submitted another licensing offer, amending the per-
patent royalties and proposing a licence for the entire
UWP UK SEP portfolio, including rates of 0.061%
(LTE), 0.046% (UMTS) and 0.045% (GSM single
mode) for infrastructure and 0.059% (LTE), 0.046%
(UMTS) and 0.045% (GSM single mode) for mobile
devices.10 The claimant’s proposal of August 2016 and
the defendant’s proposal of October 2016 represent the
parties’ positions in the trial.
II. Court’s reasoning
1. FRAND issues
a) The purpose of the FRAND declaration
Birss J starts by stressing that it is the underlying pur-
pose of the FRAND concept to strike a fair balance be-
tween the interests involved: an appropriate return on
innovation should be secured for the patentee, avoiding
4 The Master Sale Agreement (MSA) was concluded in 2013 between
claimant and Ericsson. Pursuant to the agreement, 2’185 patents and ap-
plications were transferred to claimant from Ericsson via Cluster LLP.
The MSA entitled Ericsson to a share in the patent royalties and con-
tained the option to transfer a substantial number of additional patents
to claimant in the future. With a number of defenses that form the focus
of a different prong of the overall litigation, defendants inter alia contend
that the MSA generally failed to transfer the FRAND commitments made
by Ericsson towards ETSI to claimant, because (a) it does not require
claimant to give any FRAND undertaking, (b) even if there were such an
obligation, it could not be enforced by third parties and (c) the MSA
does not prohibit claimant from obtaining licensing terms more favor-
able than those Ericsson could obtain. Furthermore, defendants allege
that claimant and Ericsson could, as an effect of the patent portfolio divi-
sion brought about by the MSA, demand excessive royalties. Moreover, it
is contended that particular clauses of the MSA have the object or poten-
tial effect of restricting competition under Article 101 TFEU because they
define minimum royalties and exclude alternative royalty schemes. Cf. on
all of this Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC, HP-2014-000005, 2 October
2015, 19 November 2015, 23 November 2015, 7 December 2015, 16
December 2015, 28 January 2016, 29 January 2016, 12 February 2016, 22
March 2016, 29 April 2016, 27 May 2016.
5 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 5.
6 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 81.
7 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 9 et seq.
8 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 81.
9 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 12 et seq.
10 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 14.
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patent hold-up. On the other hand, it is necessary to
prevent a patent “hold-out” committed by patent im-
plementers unwilling to obtain a licence.11
b) Validity of the FRAND declaration under French
law
The court clearly states that the ETSI FRAND undertak-
ing given by claimant, which is not a member of ETSI,
is enforceable by third parties (such as the defendant)
under French law, the law governing the ETSI IPR
Policy (Art. 12) as well as the IPR declaration form.
Taking into account the text of Art. 3.1.2 of the ETSI
Guide on IPRs, the offer made by ETSI in the IPR dec-
laration form, including all relevant contractual terms
and identifying the conditions under which ETSI will
include IPRs in its database on SEP, is accepted by the
IPR holder when the latter completes and signs the
form. The result is a contract for the benefit of third
parties between ETSI and the IPR holder.12 In particu-
lar, the declaration is sufficiently clear and substantial
so as to impose obligations on both ETSI and the de-
clarant.13 Hence, the declaration is not just a way of
providing information to ETSI and the market, but,
rather, a formal commitment capable of binding the de-
clarant14 and requiring him to grant standard imple-
menters licences on FRAND terms.15 However, the
FRAND undertaking neither brings about a licensing
contract immediately nor can it be enforced in such a
way as to legally compel either party to enter in a con-
tract against their will. Instead, “[i]f a patentee refuses
to enter into a licence which a court has determined is
FRAND then [. . .] a court can and in my judgment
should normally refuse to grant relief for patent in-
fringement. The converse applies to an implementer
who refuses to accept a FRAND licence. In that case the
normal relief for patent infringement should normally
follow”.16
c) FRAND as a “range” or a “dot”?
The court also addresses the intensely disputed question
of whether a range of licensing terms may qualify as
FRAND or whether only one single set of conditions,
in particular one single royalty rate, can truly be
FRAND.17 The assumption of a range of FRAND con-
ditions may lead to the so called Vringo-problem,18 a
situation in which the offers presented by the parties
differ but are both FRAND. Although this outcome
might, says Birss J, be satisfactory with respect to com-
petition law and the contractual FRAND undertaking,
the contradiction between the offers may have to be re-
solved by the grant or refusal of an injunction. This, in
turn, can cause an “international coercion” effect if a
court grants the injunction in its territory on the basis
that a putative licensee has not taken a licence although
the reason the licensee had no licence was that the only
terms on offer were a global licence which the licensee
did not want.19
Hence, if there can be a FRAND range, then in order
to adjudicate that a particular rate is the “right” rate in
the circumstances, either a further principle needs to
apply aside from FRAND or the parties would have to
agree to accept whatever rate the court chooses in the
exercise of its equitable discretion.20 The claimant ar-
gued that the patentee’s offer should win in this situa-
tion in the sense that the court should grant an
injunction against the defendant, because by making a
FRAND offer it had discharged its obligations under
the FRAND undertaking. The defendant, conversely, ar-
gued that the injunction should be refused because the
patentee would not accept the licensee’s FRAND terms.
Since the FRAND system is for the benefit of the imple-
menters allowing them to access the technology, the lat-
ter terms should however be accepted.21 The court,
however, comes to the conclusion that a single set of
FRAND terms (including the rate and all other terms)
for a given situation is the workable concept to be pur-
sued. At first sight, problems may arise in terms of
competition law because, if only one set of terms in
given circumstances can truly be FRAND and if
FRAND also represents the line between abusive and
non-abusive conduct, then every agreed licence in the
entire industry is at a serious risk of being contrary to
competition law. However, while competition law con-
siderations may well indicate why a rate is not FRAND
in general and as a matter of principle, for competition
law to be relevant it will be necessary but not sufficient
for a rate not to be the true FRAND rate.22
Furthermore, in the opinion of the court, the as-
sumption of a single set of FRAND terms does not cre-
ate legal uncertainty by allowing a party who had
11 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 92, 95.
12 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 112 et seq.
13 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 115 et seq., 123 et seq.
14 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 130 et seq.
15 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 133 et seq.
16 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 140 et seq. Whether the FRAND under-
taking could be regarded as constituting an “acte juridique unilatéral”
was left undecided by the Court.
17 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 147; cf. also LG Düsseldorf, 31 March
2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, paras. 256 et seq.; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March
2016 – Case No. 4a O 126/14, paras. 250 et seq.
18 Vringo v. ZTE, EWHC, HC-2012-000076, 28 November 2014.
19 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 149.
20 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 150.
21 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 151.
22 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 152-153.
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agreed to licensing terms to later contend that the
agreed terms were not FRAND because they differed
from the sole “true” FRAND terms. Terms that are so
far removed from FRAND as to contravene competi-
tion law would be unenforceable and have all the conse-
quences of a breach of competition law. Below this
threshold, however, the ETSI FRAND undertaking does
not entitle either party to challenge agreed terms subse-
quently as being non-FRAND. If parties agree on licens-
ing terms then their rights and obligations under the
ETSI FRAND undertaking are discharged and replaced
by their contractual rights under the licence.23
Consequently, the court emphasizes that the impor-
tance of the FRAND undertaking will be “historic” for
concluded agreements: once agreement has been
reached, the contract must govern the rights and obli-
gations of the parties.24 Nor does the fact that putative
comparable licences might show a range of rates and
other terms as having been agreed between other parties
falsify the idea that for a given situation there is only
one set of true FRAND terms.25 Accordingly, the court
rejects the aforementioned arguments of the claimant
and the defendant, stressing that the FRAND undertak-
ing serves not only the interests of the patentee or the
licensee but, rather, aims to strike a balance between
both sides.26
Turning to the process of negotiating FRAND li-
cences, the court states that the FRAND concept needs
not only be a description of a set of licence terms but
that it can also serve to describe the process by which a
set of terms are agreed. A “FRAND approach” should
be taken by both the patentee and the implementer to
the negotiation of their licence. This does allow for
starting offers leaving room for good faith negotiations.
However, while the fact that an opening offer differs
from the “true FRAND rate” is in compliance with a
FRAND approach, extreme offers and taking an intran-
sigent approach will contravene this principle.27
d) Court determination of FRAND rates or other
FRAND terms
Taking into account existing court practice in other
countries, Birss J considers courts to be capable of de-
termining whether a given set of terms, particularly a
given royalty rate, qualifies as FRAND. Arriving at a
FRAND royalty, he explains, is not different conceptu-
ally from assessing what a reasonable royalty would be
in a patent damages enquiry.28
In its analysis of how to assess FRAND, the court
started by pointing out the relevance of comparable li-
cences (“comparables”) such as party evidence, other li-
cences, court decisions or arbitral awards in other cases.
In order to be selected as comparables in the present
case, two criteria had to be fulfilled: (a) the licensor is
the claimant or Ericsson; and (b) the licence is “recent”.
According to the court, it is however not necessary for
the licensee to be the defendant or a similarly situated
company. The reason is that it would be unfair and dis-
criminatory to assess what is FRAND by reference to
specific licensees, since their ability to resist hold-up or
to hold-out might vary depending on their bargaining
power.29 More specifically, an approach that starts from
a global rate as a benchmark and then adjusts this rate
as appropriate was deemed a useful way of determining
FRAND rates.
In terms of non-discrimination, the court distin-
guishes between “general” and “hard-edged” non-
discrimination. The first aspect is part of an overall as-
sessment of the inter-related concepts making up
FRAND by which one can derive a royalty rate applica-
ble as a benchmark. This rate is non-discriminatory be-
cause it is a measure of the intrinsic value of the
portfolio being licensed, but it does not depend on the
licensee. The hard-edged non-discrimination obliga-
tion, to the extent it exists, is a distinct factor that may
lead to the reduction of a royalty rate or the adjustment
of any licence term which would otherwise have been
regarded as FRAND. It takes into account the situation
of the particular licensee seeking to rely on it.30
e) Fundamentals on FRAND rates and
telecommunication standards
As to FRAND royalty calculation in the ICT sector, the
court identifies two main approaches, the “top down”
approach and an approach based on an assessment of
comparable licence rates. Cutting things rather short
for the purpose of this summary, the “top down” ap-
proach starts from the appropriate total aggregate roy-
alty burden for a given standard and then tries to
determine the relative value of each licensor’s patent
portfolio as a share of the total relevant patent portfolio
essential to that standard. If an indirect comparison
with third party licences, such as Ericsson’s licences
that formerly included all the SEPs at issue, is con-
ducted, a view has to be formed about the relative value
of the claimant’s portfolio against (the rate for)
23 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 155.
24 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 168.
25 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 157.
26 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 158-161.
27 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 162-163.
28 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 169.
29 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 175.
30 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 177.
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Ericsson’s portfolio.31 The measures conducted by the
claimant and the defendants in order to assess the value
of the licensor’s patent portfolio were based on catego-
rizing and counting patents, a technique that treats all
patents in a given category as being of equal value.32
Ericsson, by contrast, referred in licensing negotiations
to a technique seeking to “unpack” licences by evaluat-
ing a party’s technical contribution to the pertinent
standard as a way of valuing its portfolio. In the view of
the court, this method might cause difficulties if a port-
folio of patents is (as in the present case) acquired after
the standard has been set.33
f) Application to the case at hand
According to the court, it is common ground that some
kind of appropriate methodology is needed beyond
simply adding up patents on the register or in the
ETSI database. This is due, in particular, to the
over-declaration problem, i.e. the fact that many more
patents are declared to be essential than in fact are es-
sential.34 Negotiating rates by counting patents exacer-
bates this problem of over-declaration.35 Furthermore,
the court acknowledges that a specific weighing method
is needed to deal with multimode devices, in particular
handsets.36
Even though the HPA (“Huawei Patent Analysis”) –
a methodology proposed by the defendant – proved to
be a “consistent yardstick”, Birss J refrained from ap-
plying the method because the numbers derived from it
would over-estimate the true numbers of essential pat-
ents. In other words, if a number derived from the
HPA is used as the denominator in a fraction in which
the numerator is a number derived by considering the
patents in more detail, the result will understate the sig-
nificance of the claimant’s patents.37 The court also
considered the “modified numeric proportionality ap-
proach” (MNPA)38 – a methodology applied by the
claimant – as a reasonable attempt to derive informa-
tion in order to assess the strength of a (LTE) patent
portfolio as against the industry as a whole.39 However,
in relation to the strength of the claimant’s patent port-
folio, the court was convinced that both methods
produce inaccurate results which either overestimate
(claimant) or underestimate (defendant) the true values
of the respective patents.40 Therefore, it applied an ad-
justed version of the HPA.41
As to comparables, the court evaluates a number of
them and takes them into consideration to varying de-
grees.42 A particularly interesting passage in this part of
the judgment deals with the relevance of comparables
that result from a –disclosed – arbitral award:
“Terms which were settled by an arbitrator are not evi-
dence of what willing, reasonable business people would
agree in a negotiation. In that sense a royalty in the licence
is not probative of the market value of the portfolio under
licence at all. Decisions of other courts may have persuasive
value but that will largely depend on the reasoning that
court has given to reach its conclusion. An arbitral award
is at least capable of having a similar persuasive value, but
reasoning supporting the terms in this licence is not avail-
able. [. . .] Without seeing the reasoning of the arbitrators
one cannot see how they arrive at the conclusion they
did”.43
The requirement of non-discrimination was discussed
in some detail, but ultimately it had only limited impact
on the determination of FRAND licensing conditions:
the court distinguishes between, on the one hand, a
general non-discrimination requirement which is met
by defining – as the court did – a benchmark for the de-
termination of FRAND licensing conditions that is
equally applicable for all implementers/potential li-
censees seeking the same kind of licence.44 The so-
called “hard-edged non-discrimination” criterion, on
the other hand, requires the patentee to grant to an im-
plementer licensing conditions it has already granted to
another implementer, provided the two implementers
are in a comparable position regarding the licensing.45
In the view of the court, a hard-edged non-discrimina-
tion requirement is established by competition law,
yet only where discrimination between implementers
would amount to a distortion of competition.46
Whether a hard-edged non-discrimination requirement
also follows from the ETSI FRAND declaration alone is
not made entirely clear. In any case, such a declaration-
31 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 180.
32 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 181.
33 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 185.
34 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 200-201.
35 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 202.
36 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 220 et seq.
37 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 361.
38 Cf. Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 80.
39 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 366-368.
40 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 372-374.
41 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 376.
42 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 382 et seq.
43 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 411.
44 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 481 et seq., 503, also on the difference
between the assessment of this type of non-discrimination and the exer-
cise of assessing comparables in order to arrive at FRAND licensing
conditions.
45 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 485 et seq.
46 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 484.
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based requirement would equally apply only where the
discrimination was far-reaching enough to distort com-
petition.47 In this case, the defendant and the licensee
Samsung were “similarly situated” enough for a non-
discrimination requirement to apply, but the require-
ment was not neglected by the claimant in a way so as
to distort competition.48
Aside from the royalty rate, the major disagreement
between the parties concerned the scope of the
licence.49 The defendant is only willing to obtain a li-
cence under the claimant’s UK patent portfolio,
whereas the claimant seeks to grant a worldwide licence
and contends that it is entitled to insist on it.50 Based
on the assumption that the licensor has a worldwide
portfolio for SEPs, Birss J generally considers the licen-
sor’s offer for a worldwide portfolio licence as unlikely
to be abusive.51 Looking at the facts of the case he con-
siders, inter alia,52 the claimant’s portfolio to be large
enough and to have sufficiently wide geographical scope
for a licensor and a licensee acting reasonably and will-
ingly to agree on a worldwide licence.53 Therefore, a
worldwide licence is, in this case, qualified as FRAND
and as not being in violation of competition law,
whereas the defendant’s insistence on a licence limited
to the UK is not FRAND.54 However, considering com-
parable licences, a reduced rate should apply for sales in
China. Since the claimant’s portfolio is smaller in
China and contains fewer relevant SEPs than the num-
bers used to set the benchmark rates above, a fair and
reasonable approach would be to scale the rate with an
additional factor determined by the numbers of rele-
vant SEPs in China.55 At the same time, Birss J makes it
clear that it is not a workable approach to divide the
world into too many categories in the sense that any
other region of the world should have lower rates than
the benchmark rate. But it could be a fair and reason-
able approach to treat, for instance, three regions of the
world differently.56 Finally, the court elaborates on the
other terms to be included in a worldwide licence57 and
on the terms which a UK-only portfolio licence should
theoretically include.58
2. Competition law
The part of the decision concerning competition law fo-
cuses on Art. 102 TFEU, which is equivalent to Sec. 18
of the Competition Act 1998.59 Against the wording of
these provisions, the core issues are whether the claim-
ant (1) enjoys a dominant position and, if so, then
whether (2) it has abused that dominant position.60
a) Dominant position
In order to assess the existence of a dominant position,
the court defines the relevant market as being the dis-
tinct market for licensing each SEP individually. With
the market defined in that way, it is not surprising that
a 100 % market share is attributed to the SEP owner
and the defendant submitted that there was a presump-
tion that such a party was dominant.61 Yet the claim-
ant, relying on the opinion of AG Wathelet in Huawei
v. ZTE that a SEP does not necessarily amount to
market dominance, submitted that the defendant’s alle-
gation of dominance insufficiently relied on this pre-
sumption only.62 The presence of the FRAND
undertaking and the countervailing buyer power held
by potential licensees amounted, in the claimant’s view,
to sufficient grounds for rebutting the presumption in
this case.63 Birss J, however, rejected the claimant’s po-
sition and criticized that the claimant should have ad-
vanced a positive case instead of merely pleading for
non-admission of the presumption of dominance.64
aa) Countervailing buyer power. Furthermore, the court
dismissed the points brought by the claimant on coun-
tervailing buyer power, mainly because it considered
them too generic, imprecise, insufficiently substantiated
and not in line with the EU Commission’s decision in
Motorola.65 With regard to the Motorola decision, the
court stated, in particular, that even if the alleged domi-
nant entity cannot act independently vis-à-vis one
particular large customer, if that entity can act indepen-
dently of the customers in the market in general to the
relevant degree, then it should be characterized as being
in a dominant position.66
47 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 501 et seq.
48 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 488 et seq., 510 et seq.
49 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 523.
50 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 524.
51 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 535.
52 On a potential necessity of the portfolio to cover every state in the world,
on tying issues, and on the relevance of claimant’s litigation in various
fora, cf. Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 545 et seq.
53 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 538-543.
54 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 572.
55 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 582-584.
56 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 587.
57 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 593 et seq.
58 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 596 et seq.
59 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 627 et seq.
60 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 629.
61 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 631 et seq.
62 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 630-632.
63 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 633.
64 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 634.
65 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 635 et seq.
66 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 643.
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As a final consideration, Birss J stated that the SEP
owner does not need to be in a dominant position “for
the FRAND undertaking to bite,” because the commit-
ment is not imposed by competition law but by giving
the undertaking to ETSI.67
bb) The FRAND undertaking. In the present case, there
is no question that the claimant is subject to a FRAND
undertaking. Birss J is willing to take the practical effect
of this FRAND obligation into account when determin-
ing dominance:68 SEP owners and putative licensees are
both well aware that the FRAND undertaking obliges
the owner to grant licences. Hence, the FRAND under-
taking was considered to operate as a practical con-
straint on a SEP owner’s market power.
“In the relevant market FRAND does give buyers a form of
market power they would not otherwise have which they
can and do wield”.69
cc) Hold-out. As to hold-out, the court, taking into ac-
count the relevant deliberations in the CJEU judgments
Huawei v. ZTE and Lundbeck, stated that there is a clear
potential on theoretical grounds for such a strategy to
occur and that it can be an economically rational ap-
proach for a licensee to take.70 It accepted the claim-
ant’s view that prior to commencement of the present
proceedings no single manufacturer, aside from
Lenovo, was willing to discuss the commercial terms of
a licence. However, Birss J considered the evidence for
hold-out to be less strong than the claimant had
submitted.71
dd) Conclusion. In sum, the claimant was considered to
be in a dominant position in the market for licences
under the SEPs-in-suit.72
b) Abuse
As to an abuse of UWP’s dominant position, four cate-
gories of conduct were on the table, namely (1) prema-
ture litigation against the background of Huawei v.
ZTE; (2) unfair excessive pricing; (3) bundling / tying
in SEPS and non-SEPs; and (4) “multijurisdictional
bundling”, an issue, however, that was not addressed in
further detail by the court.
aa) Premature litigation. Since the claimant had made
its 2014 licensing offer73 after the proceedings had com-
menced, the defendant pleaded lack of compliance with
the Huawei v. ZTE conduct obligations and thus neces-
sarily an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU. The claimant,
in turn, contended that the true principle to be derived
from Huawei v. ZTE was less rigid and that its conduct
complied with an appropriate reading of the CJEU’s de-
cision.74 By reference to the wording of its claim, the
claimant argued that no “action for a prohibitory in-
junction or for the recall of products” in the sense of
Huawei v. ZTE has been raised in the UK proceedings,
but a more subtle relief which is permitted under
Huawei v. ZTE and requests an injunction only should
the defendant refuse to obtain a FRAND licence and,
hence, be deemed an unwilling licensee.75
The court agreed with defendant that the mere
wording of a claim cannot be decisive in whether the
claim is encompassed by Huawei v. ZTE as this would
invite avoidance and, ultimately, render the CJEU’s de-
cision ineffective.76 However, there is room for struc-
turing a claim so as to circumvent the Huawei v. ZTE
conduct requirements because the CJEU itself draws a
distinction between, on the one hand, starting proceed-
ings which only claim damages (or an account) but no
injunction and, on the other hand, starting proceedings
which include a claim for an injunction.77 Although
this distinction can, at least in English law, be a difficult
one as a claim may be amended after issue (or even af-
ter trial) Birss J declares – somewhat reluctantly – to see
no room for extending the Huawei v. ZTE conduct re-
quirements tel quel to claims that do not aim at an
injunction.78
The defendant found less support for its allegation
that the claimant continued to seek injunctive relief
even after the defendant declared its willingness to ob-
tain a FRAND licence. According to Birss J, it is plainly
correct that the claimant has maintained its claim
for injunctive relief throughout the proceedings.79
Furthermore, the wording used in the claim (“insofar
as the claimant is and remains required to grant such li-
cence”) introduces a widely-stated contingency about
the claimant’s position, irrespective of the defendant’s
status as an (un)willing licensee.80 Nonetheless, it is not
accurate that the claim was maintained even after the
67 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 638-648.
68 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 654.
69 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 656.
70 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 657-665.
71 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 669.
72 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 670.
73 Cf. para. A.
74 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 674-676.
75 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 679-680.
76 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 681.
77 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 682.
78 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 682.
79 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 705.
80 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 683.
Peter Picht  Unwired Planet v Huawei 7FROM GRUR INT.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jiplp/jpx152/4102186/Unwired-Planet-v-Huawei-A-Seminal-SEP-FRAND
by University of Zurich user
on 01 September 2017
defendant made it clear that it was willing to enter into
a FRAND licence.81 The defendant agreed to obtain
what it contended is a FRAND licence but never de-
clared its unqualified willingness to licence at FRAND
terms, whatever these terms may be.82 In contrast, the
claimant tried to insist on a worldwide licence but took
into account the possibility that it may not be entitled
to demand it, i.e. it maintained a fall-back position.83
In consequence, the court described the claimant’s ac-
tion as being one for a prohibitory injunction, but not
one in which the patentee has persisted in seeking such
an injunction after the implementer has given an un-
qualified commitment to obtain whatever licence is
FRAND.84
In order to determine whether the initiation of pro-
ceedings qualifies as abusive pursuant to Art. 102
TFEU, the court provides an overview of the Huawei v.
ZTE judgment, in particular paras. 54-70, and applies it
to the facts of the case.85 In doing so, Birss J deduces
the following principles from the CJEU judgment:86
“i) In the judgment the CJEU has set out a scheme which
both the patentee and implementer can be expected to fol-
low in the context of a dispute about a patent declared es-
sential to a standard and subject to a FRAND undertaking.
ii) In stating that the implementer and patentee must ex-
press a willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms,
the CJEU is referring to a willingness in general terms. The
fact that concrete proposals are also required does not
mean it is relevant to ask if those proposals are actually
FRAND or not.
iii) If the patentee complies with the scheme prior to start-
ing a claim for infringement of that patent which includes
a claim for an injunction, then bringing such a claim will
not be abusive under Art. 102. That is the ratio of the
CJEU’s decision.
iv) In the circumstances contemplated by the CJEU, bring-
ing a claim for infringement of a SEP which includes a
claim for an injunction without prior notice of any kind
will necessarily be an abuse of dominant position. Insofar
as the decision identifies what is abusive rather than what
is not, the decision does not go further than that.
v) Bringing a claim for infringement which includes a
claim for an injunction even with sufficient notice is capa-
ble of being an abuse of dominant position. However, the
judgment does not hold that if the circumstances diverge
from the scheme set out in any way then a patentee will
necessarily abuse their dominant position by starting such
a claim. In those circumstances, the patentee’s conduct
may or may not be abusive. The scheme sets out standard
of behaviour against which both parties behaviour can be
measured to decide in all the circumstances if an abuse has
taken place.
vi) Nor does it follow that if the patentee complies with the
scheme such that bringing the action is not per se abusive,
the patentee can behave with impunity after issue. Again,
the scheme sets out standards of behaviour against which
both parties’ behaviour can be measured to decide if an
abuse has taken place.
vii) If the patentee does abuse its dominant position in
bringing the claim or in its conduct after issue, that affords
a defence to the claim for an injunction. In other words the
proper remedy is likely to be refusal of an injunction even
though a patent has been found to be valid and infringed
and the implementer has no licence.
viii) The legal circumstances of this case differ from the cir-
cumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect.
FRAND is justiciable and the undertaking can be effectively
enforced at the suit of the defendant irrespective of Art.
102. The defendant does not need Art. 102 to have a de-
fence to the injunction claim.”
The court’s answer to the question of whether the
claimant committed an abuse by litigating prematurely
starts from the findings that neither the claimant nor
the defendant fully complied with their Huawei v. ZTE
obligations and that the question of an abuse had to be
decided by looking at all the circumstances.87 In doing
so, the court holds that the defendant had, at the time
the litigation began, sufficient notice of the claimant’s
SEPs, of its willingness to license and of the need to ob-
tain such a licence in case the SEPs were valid and es-
sential.88 Against this background, the defendant was
supposed to understand that issuing proceedings in-
cluding an injunction claim did not represent a refusal
to license, but instead sought to support the conclusion
thereof.89 As regards the Huawei v. ZTE requirement to
present the alleged infringer with a specific, written of-
fer for a licence on FRAND terms, the court confirmed
that the claimant had submitted the key terms of a li-
cence offer, including the royalty rate, to the defendant.
The fact that the information was provided only a few
weeks after commencing the proceedings was not con-
sidered problematic, as this amounted to a relatively
short time outside the letter of the CJEU scheme and
the issuing of proceedings did not indicate that the
claimant’s unwillingness to license its SEPs.90 The de-
fendant’s response to the specific offer is regarded as
appropriate by the court as it requested further details,
81 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 705.
82 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 706 et seq.
83 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 709.
84 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 712.
85 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 713 et seq.
86 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 744.
87 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 747.
88 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 748 et seq.
89 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 750.
90 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 753.
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as well as the claimant’s response in providing those de-
tails.91 However, the defendant never subsequently
made an unqualified offer to accept whatever were
FRAND terms, but always reserved for itself the right to
argue that a licence of worldwide scope was not
FRAND.92 In sum, the court rejected defendant’s inter-
pretation of Huawei v. ZTE that it had a defence to the
claimant’s injunction claim because it was sued before
FRAND terms were offered, and affirmed that the com-
mencement of the action by the claimant, including a
claim for injunctive relief did not constitute an abuse of
its dominant position.93
bb) Unfair excessive pricing – Art. 102 (a) TFEU. At
the outset of the analysis on excessive pricing the court,
referring to economic findings, clarified that there is a
crucial difference between (non-) FRAND rates and un-
fair pricing in the sense that even if a rate is higher than
FRAND it is not necessarily abusive under Art. 102
TFEU.94 While the defendant claimed that all proposals
made by the claimant exceeded FRAND and thus in-
volved an attempt to impose an unfair selling price, the
claimant deemed all its offers FRAND and stated that
even if they were not, they were not abusive because: (1)
they were made in the context of good faith negotiations,
(2) they are not significantly higher than FRAND, and
(3) there was no analysis of distortion of competition.95
Birss J, firstly, rejected the defendant’s allegation of a dis-
tortion of competition since no detailed economic analy-
sis had been carried out.96 Secondly, regarding the
argument of good faith negotiations, the court found
that as long as the recipient of the offer can see it is
made in context of SEPs and FRAND, there will only be
a violation of Art. 102 (a) TFEU if the offer is so far
above FRAND as to disrupt or prejudice the negotiations
in a manner that renders a process of convergence un-
likely. This interpretation does not contradict Huawei v.
ZTE because the abuse in that case is not the demand of
a non-FRAND rate, but the premature bringing of in-
junctive patent infringement proceedings.97 In a detailed
analysis of the rates offered by the claimant and the de-
fendant, the court concludes that these rates were several
times higher (the claimant’s offer) or lower (the defen-
dant’s offers) than the FRAND level.98 This degree of
deviation does not, however, strike the court as contra-
vening Art. 102 TFEU because “an offer a number of
times lower than the relevant FRAND benchmark does
not prejudice the negotiations and corroborates the find-
ing that an offer a number of times higher than the
benchmark does not do so either.“99 Even though the
court emphasized that imposing a rate multiple times
higher or lower than the FRAND rate was generally un-
acceptable, it finally rejected the competition law case on
unfair pricing because, in the present case, the offers
were made in a negotiation process without prejudicing
or disrupting it.100
cc) Bundling / tying in SEPS and non-SEPs. As to the
accusation of bundling, the court rejects the claimant’s
argument that detailed economic evidence was needed
in order to establish that the bundling of SEPs with
non-SEPs could eliminate competition between non-
SEP technologies in practice.101 Even though it is clear
to the court that a patentee subject to a FRAND under-
taking cannot insist on a licence which bundles SEPs
and non-SEPs, it is not contrary to competition law to
make a first offer comprising both kinds of patents.102
The mere fact that a licence includes both does not take
it out of FRAND – given that parties do, in fact, con-
clude licences comprising SEPs and non-SEPs – nor
does it indicate that a patentee has used the market
power given by the SEPs to secure a licence under the
non-SEPs.103 In the present circumstances the court re-
jected the bundling argument with respect to the claim-
ant’s April 2014 offer, including SEPs and non-SEPs,
because after a respective request by the defendant, the
claimant separated out the non-SEPs in July 2015.
“Those are not the actions of a party trying to use its mar-
ket power given by patents essential to a standard to tie in
a further licence under its non-SEP portfolio. If, however,
claimant had insisted on putting the two together after that
then the conclusion might have been different”.104
3. Remedies
The claimant sought three remedies: (a) injunction; (b)
damages; and (c) declarations that its offers were
FRAND.
a) Injunction
Owing to the fact that the relevant patents have been
found valid and infringed, that the claimant would like
91 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 754.
92 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 754.
93 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 754-755.
94 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 757.
95 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 758-759.
96 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 760.
97 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 765.
98 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 773 et seq.
99 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 783.
100 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 784.
101 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 785-786.
102 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 787.
103 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 787.
104 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 789-790.
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to enter into a worldwide FRAND licence and that it is
entitled to insist on it, an injunction ought to be
granted against the defendant. However, since the de-
fendant did not engage with the terms ultimately pro-
posed, Birss J, exercising his discretion, does not grant
the injunction on the day the judgement is handed
down in public but grants the parties additional time to
conclude a licence in accordance with the conditions
set by the court.105
b) Damages
Since the defendant refused to enter into a worldwide
FRAND licence upon which the claimant was entitled
to insist, the court had to assess the question of dam-
ages. According to the court, what the SEP owner lost is
decisive, i.e. which amount of money the patentee
would have earned in licensing if a willing licensor and
a willing licensee had agreed on a FRAND licence.106
c) Declarations
The court made a formal declaration that the (world-
wide) licence ultimately framed in the judgement is
FRAND. If the defendant wished to, it would also be
ready to declare that each of the original offers were not
FRAND. The declaration sought by the defendant that
the claimant had abused its dominant position is, how-
ever, refused.107
III. Concluding remarks
Undoubtedly, Birss J’s decision in Unwired Planet v
Huawei is of great importance, not only because of its
pioneer role for the UK but also due to its multi-
facetted, thorough approach. Some elements of this ap-
proach are likely to reverberate beyond the specific de-
tails addressed today, such as the balanced view on
hold-up and hold-out which avoids blaming either pat-
ent owners or standard-implementers as the predefined
“bad guys” in the SEP/FRAND arena. At the same time,
not every line of the decision ought to be received as
the one and only manual for how to deal with FRAND
cases in the future. As the balance of this article can
only sketch, some statements in the decision are prob-
lematic, some diverge from the positions adopted by
other European (so far mainly German) courts, and –
not only because of this divergence – some questions
dealt with in UWP v Huawei may ultimately have to be
decided by the CJEU.
1. Paving the contractual road to a FRAND
licence
Certainly, one of the most important aspects – and an
achievement – of this decision is the positive stance it
takes on the contractual prong of SEP-licensing. Birss J
makes it very clear that in order to receive a FRAND li-
cence an implementer can rely not only on competition
law but also on a contractual claim, following directly
from the FRAND declaration which establishes a third-
party beneficial contract. This is in line with the promi-
nence of contractual mechanisms in the US case-law on
SEP licensing108 but it differs from the view of – at least
some – German courts that denied a third-party benefi-
cial contract based on FRAND declarations.109
Unwired Planet removes this roadblock and helps to
attribute to contract law a greater role in the context of
SEP/FRAND-licensing. This holds true all the more so
because Birss J underlines that once the licensing con-
tract has been concluded, it is this contract which
should govern the relationship between the parties. It
remains to be seen whether competition law really will
have no say over an established SEP/FRAND-licence –
what if the contract contains no-challenge clauses that
conflict with EU competition law?110 – and genuine
patent law mechanisms111 still remain largely unused.
Nonetheless, the ordering of the SEP/FRAND world
should, where possible, be a matter of patent and con-
tract law, with competition law stepping in only where
these prongs of the law fail.112 In principal, although
maybe not in their present shape, contract and patent
law are, with their more specific and more detailed rules
that do not depend on a finding of dominance, in a bet-
ter position to do the fine-tuning. The historical devel-
opment, i.e. the high degree of harmonization and
effective enforcement in EU competition law, has
shifted considerable importance and activity to this
field, and competition law should not give up the role
of a watchdog. However, the road embarked upon by
this decision may permit the watchdog to remain in its
kennel more often in the future. Such a development is
unlikely to contradict the CJEU’s position in Huawei v.
ZTE, provided the overall level of enforcement against
105 Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 794.
106 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 796-800.
107 Unwired Planet v Huawei, paras. 803-804.
108 In re Innovation IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, MDL Docket No.
2303 (N.D. III. 27 September 2013), paras. 3, 4.
109 LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 120/14, para. 338; LG
Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 122/14, paras. 354 et seq.;
LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 123/14, para. 323; LG
Düsseldorf, 24 April 2012 – Case No. 4b O 273/10.
110 Cf. Art. 5 Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on the application of Art.
101(3) TFEU to categories of technology transfer agreements.
111 On patent law-based approaches cf., for instance, Hilty/Slowinski, GRUR
Int. 2015, 781; Ullrich, GRUR 2007, 817.
112 Cf. in greater detail Picht, GRUR Int. 2014 1 (5 et seq.).
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unwanted SEP/FRAND-related practices (from the pat-
entees’ as well as the implementers’ side) does not suffer
from it. After all, concepts like good faith, recognized
commercial practices, and reliance of implementers on
the FRAND declaration which were employed by the
CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE113 have a strong contractual
flavour.
To become a main trail towards resolving SEP/
FRAND conflicts, however, the contractual road needs
to be further paved by answering questions left unre-
solved by Unwired Planet. To what extent does, for in-
stance, the third-party beneficial contract established by
the FRAND declaration preordain – from a contractual,
not a competition law perspective – the content of a
subsequent licence contract concluded between the pat-
entee and a specific implementer? Furthermore, the de-
cision says nothing on the important issue of whether,
from a contractual perspective, the patentee can select
the market level (component producer, end product
producer, vendor, etc.) at which it is ready to license its
SEPs or whether the third-party beneficial contract re-
sulting from the ETSI FRAND declaration prevents
such level selection and entitles each and every
standard-implementer to a licence if it wishes to take
one. And does Birss J, by alluding to equity consider-
ations, intend that English common law play the role of
a corrective that may modify the outcome of a French
law-based analysis of an ETSI FRAND declaration? The
application of French law to contractual relations be-
tween ETSI and the patentees is, as a general rule, one
plausible way of applying the EU rules on conflicts of
laws.114 A sweeping additional application of domestic
principles such as equity or good faith may jeopardize
the clarity of this concept and even create tension with
EU law.
2. Presumed dominance and “qualified
unFRANDliness” – the threshold for the
application of competition law?
Laudable as the emphasis of Unwired Planet on the con-
tractual prong of SEP/FRAND licensing is, it will prob-
ably meet with criticism in its determination of the
threshold beyond which competition law steps in. In
the court’s view, there seem to be three points of
reference: The “true” FRAND level of the licensing, a
zone around this level in which licensing conditions
and party conduct are not truly FRAND but competi-
tion law intervention is not yet triggered, and a zone
where the deviation from FRAND becomes so severe
that competition law ought to step in.115 Such a con-
cept has the advantage of leaving considerable scope for
negotiation as parties may place their initial offers
rather high and low respectively and then move towards
each other without having to fear that, at each moment,
one side may ask for competition law sanctions on the
grounds of a FRAND violation. Whether, however, the
concept complies with the CJEU’s decision in Huawei/
ZTE is less obvious as the CJEU has not clearly limited
competition law intervention to particularly severe de-
viations from the FRAND concept. In German case-
law, the question of whether the parties’ initial offers
may differ (slightly) from FRAND is so far answered
differently, but there is a good chance that a negative
answer will prevail.116 And even the courts that favour
greater leeway for the parties sound more restrictive
than Birss J.117 Moreover, they tend to look at the ob-
jective divergence between the content of the offered li-
cence and the content of a FRAND licence. Birss, in
contrast, seems to take an approach that focuses more
on the negotiation process and the attitude of the par-
ties when he asks whether a non-FRAND offer is likely
to disrupt or prejudice the negotiations in a manner that
renders a process of convergence unlikely. Be that as it
may, for the interaction between contract, patent and
competition law in SEP/FRAND matters it is evidently
of vital importance whether competition law has to step
back only where the other areas of the law do effectively
sanction even limited FRAND violations and this may
well be one of the questions on which the CJEU will
have to rule in the future.
As regards market dominance as a prerequisite for
the application of Art. 102 TFEU, the Unwired Planet
decision is something like an outlier compared to the
existing (post-) Huawei v. ZTE case-law. To begin with,
the decision addresses market power at length while, so
far, the majority of the case-law – including Huawei v.
ZTE itself118 – tended to leave the question unde-
cided.119 This is, as such, quite welcome as the
European SEP/FRAND landscape could certainly use
113 CJEU, 16 July 2015, C-170/13 – Huawei v. ZTE, para. 65.
114 Cf. Art. 3 (1) Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 on the law applicable to con-
tractual obligations (Rome I), 2008 OJ L 177/6.
115 Cf., with a similar interpretation, Contreras, A New Perspective on
FRAND Royalties: Unwired Planet v Huawei, Antitrust Source, 2017,
forthcoming.
116 LG Mannheim, 29 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 66/15, para. 58; LG
Mannheim, 8 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 96/14, paras. 75 et seq.
117 LG Mannheim, 29 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 66/15, para. 58; LG
Mannheim, 8 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 96/14, paras. 75 et seq.
118 CJEU, 16 July 2015, C-170/13 – Huawei v. ZTE, para. 43.
119 LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015 – Case No. 4a O 93/14; LG Düsseldorf,
3 November 2015 – Case No. 4a O 144/14; LG Mannheim, 27 November
2015 – Case No. 2 O 106/14; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No.
4a O 73/14; LG Mannheim, 29 January 2016 – Case No 7 O 66/15.
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more case-law on the topic.120 Furthermore, Unwired
Planet holds that the relevant market in which domi-
nance needs to be determined, is constituted by the sin-
gle SEP for which a licence is sought. This is arguably
not in line with the prevailing opinion of German
courts which focus rather on the market for products
or services implementing the standard of which the SEP
forms a part.121 And last but not least, the decision
takes up Advocate General Wathelet’s suggestion of a
rebuttable presumption of dominance based mainly on
SEP ownership,122 a proposal not much heeded in the
post-Huawei case-law.123 In spite of this lukewarm re-
sponse, a presumption of dominance can help to avoid
court battles over dominance and to focus the competi-
tion law part of SEP/FRAND disputes on the core is-
sues, namely the conduct of the parties and the
licensing conditions. If rebuttable, the presumption
does not seem unfair towards the SEP holder, given
that it was the patentee himself that stated the
standard-essentiality of the patent, thereby implying the
dependency of all implementers on its use.124 But it
squares badly with the concept of one market per SEP,
as the patentee would always be a monopolist in this
market – what are the odds for a monopolist to rebut
the presumption of dominance? And, more impor-
tantly, the one market per SEP-concept is rather a hin-
drance than a help in focusing on the key market
processes. These are, at first, competition between tech-
nologies (and the patents reading on them) for integra-
tion into the standard and, subsequently, competition
between standard-based products and services for con-
sumer acceptance. The UWP v Huawei court itself con-
tends – convincingly – that a FRAND declaration tends
to reduce the market power of the declarant as it re-
moves competition for access to the standard and the
SEP. An implementer no longer competes for the right
to use the standard by way of its willingness to pay a
higher price for the access than another implementer
because competition law and the FRAND declaration
assure this access anyway. The concept of a market
consisting of a single SEP contradicts this fact and dis-
torts a clear view on the relevant market structures by
pretending that access to the SEP and the standard
must be gained in a competitive market process. It is
not merely happenstance that a substantial number of
scholars do not support the one market per patent-
concept either.125
3. Sequenced SEP enforcement and the reach
of Huawei v. ZTE regarding infringement
claims
One issue the court did consider from a competition
law perspective was the sequencing of negotiation and
litigation by the SEP holder. May, in particular, the pat-
entee bring a lawsuit first and make a (FRAND-) licens-
ing offer only afterwards? Does it matter whether the
lawsuit was brought before the Huawei v. ZTE decision
(so-called “transitional cases”) as in that case the paten-
tee could not know what the CJEU would require it to
do before taking court action? These questions are in-
tensely and controversially discussed in German case-
law as well.126 For transitional cases at least, flexible
handling (as also applied in Unwired Planet) is useful
because it can avoid the somewhat ineffective need to
withdraw an action only to re-file it once the (alleged)
patent infringement and a licensing offer have been
communicated to the implementer.127
One strategy patentees pursue in order to be able to
litigate and negotiate at the same time is the bringing of
an action that initially asks only for damages and the
rendering of accounts, but is afterwards extended to a
claim for an injunction. Such stratagems raise the issue
whether the Huawei conduct requirements – in particu-
lar the requirement to flag an infringement and offer a
licence before filing suit – are strictly limited to claims
for injunctions or whether they have at least some im-
pact on contiguous claims as well. The court shows
considerable sympathy for such an extension but sees
no real way to implement it given the wording of
120 In many ways a laudable exception is the decision LG Düsseldorf, 19
January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 120/14, para. VII, 6, a.
121 LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 120/14.
122 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 20 November 2014, C-170/13 –
Huawei v. ZTE, paras. 53 et seq.
123 LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015 – Case No. 4a O 93/14; LG Düsseldorf,
3 November 2015 – Case No. 4a O 144/14; LG Mannheim, 27 November
2015 – Case No. 2 O 106/14; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No.
4a O 73/14; LG Mannheim, 29 January 2016 – Case No 7 O 66/15.
124 In truth, this conclusion – and, for that matter, the entire concept of
standard-essentiality as it usually employed by courts and discussants – is
over-simplified as patents may read on parts of the standard that have to
be used by some, but not all implementers. The producer of a base-
station may, for instance, have to implement some parts of a standard
that are of no interest to a handheld producer, while both have to
implement certain core elements of the standard. In other words, some
SEPs may be more essential than others. Cf. on this also LG Düsseldorf,
19 January 2016, 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet/Samsung, para. 345; LG
Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016, 4b O 122/14 – Unwired Planet/Samsung,
para. 362; LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016, 4b O 123/14 – Unwired
Planet/Samsung, para. 331.
125 Cf. also C. Koenig/A. Trias, 32 E.I.P.R. 320, 325 f. (2010); T. Weck, NJOZ
2009, 1177 f.
126 LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015 – Case No. 4a O 93/14; LG Düsseldorf,
31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14; OLG Düsseldorf, 9 May 2016 –
Case No. I-15U 36/16; LG Mannheim, 8 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O
96/14; OLG Karlsruhe, 31 May 2016 – Case No. 6U 55/16.
127 LG Mannheim, 8 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 96/14; OLG Karlsruhe, 31
May 2016 – Case No. 6U 55/16; i.a. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 –
Case No. 4a O 73/14 to which Birss J himself references.
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Huawei v. ZTE. At least, Birss J formulates the caveat
that “it [does not] follow that if the patentee complies
with the scheme such that bringing the action is not per
se abusive, the patentee can behave with impunity after
issue”. This caveat may serve to check, inter alia, inade-
quate litigation strategies at the intersection of claims
for damages and subsequent claims for injunctions.
Although some German courts concur with the very
limited reach of Huawei,128 other decisions seem to see
more flexibility.129 As claims for damages can put se-
vere pressure on implementers to agree to a patentee’s
licensing offers, in particular if the implementer has to
fear that the claim for an injunction may later be added
to the damages litigation, it appears, in fact, question-
able whether EU competition law – or, for that matter,
the principles of good faith and recognized commercial
practices underlying contractual solutions – should
strictly limit the reach of Huawei v. ZTE to injunctions.
The Unwired Planet decision addresses another form
of litigation conduct by emphasizing that a claim for an
injunction can be more acceptable if the patentee states
clearly that the injunction is sought only if the imple-
menter remains unwilling to obtain a FRAND licence.
If these passages of the decision were meant to intro-
duce the concept of a “conditional injunction” that can
always be pursued in court, parallel to fulfilment of the
Huawei v. ZTE conduct requirements, it would be a
novelty in the post-Huawei case-law.
4. FRAND determination
The Unwired Planet decision contributes significantly to
the quest for principles that permit the determination
of FRAND licensing conditions in specific cases. The
present summary cannot go into details but lists only a
couple of key aspects:
 We must respectfully disagree with Birss J’s opinion
that there is only one, “true” set of FRAND condi-
tions. Instead, FRAND is a range which can encom-
pass a number of different sets of licensing
conditions.130, 131 As a licence can, and oftentimes
does, consist of more components than just a royalty
rate (e.g. calculation basis, cross-licensing, duration,
distribution of the risk of uncertain business devel-
opments, etc.) and as the economic meaning of the
licensing relationship for both parties depends on
the interplay of all of these conditions, a similar eco-
nomic outcome can be achieved by various sets of
conditions. Comparables – to which Birss J does at-
tribute much relevance – corroborate this point be-
cause their licensing conditions are not uniform but
vary within certain boundaries. The choice between
these sets forms an important component of the par-
ties’ freedom to negotiate. It comes as a surprise that
a decision otherwise so considerate of creating room
for negotiations takes such a rigid position here.132
The problem of who gets to choose between two of-
fers which are both FRAND – the patentee because,
after all, a patent grants the right to decide whether
and how the invention is used; or a court or arbitra-
tion tribunal because a unilateral right to choose
may re-increase hold-up and hold-out risks? – must
and can be solved otherwise than by introducing
(the fiction of) a single, “true” FRAND licence. The
decision indicates that “FRAND” has not only a con-
tent component but also a process component which
focusses on the negotiation conduct of the parties.
Leaving aside labelling considerations, this compre-
hensive view is convincing. The CJEU also accords
considerable weight to the parties’ conduct beyond
the mere content of their offers, although it does not
explicitly label this part of its requirements as
“FRAND”.
 Unwired Planet further corroborates the tendency in
post-Huawei case-law133 that worldwide SEP-
portfolio licences are FRAND-compliant.
 It remains to be seen, however, whether the court’s
indications that patentees may even (initially) re-
quire the licensing of portfolios combining SEPs and
non-SEPs without violating EC competition law134
will be accepted by European competition law courts
and enforcers. The mere fact that bundled portfolios
are actually licensed in the market does, in any case,
not shield such offers from competition law.
128 LG Mannheim, 29 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 66/15; LG Mannheim, 8
January 2016 – Case No. 7 O 96/14; LG Mannheim, 1 July 2016 – Case
No. 7 O 209/15.
129 LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016 – Case No. 4b O 120/14.
130 Hesitant also (“not wholly convinced”) Contreras, A New Perspective on
FRAND Royalties: Unwired Planet v Huawei, Antitrust Source, 2017,
forthcoming.
131 LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14; LG Düsseldorf, 31
March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 126/14.
132 Besides, it seems a bit contradictory that the decision insists on the need
to precisely determine the one, ,,true“ FRAND rate while also stating that
“the fact that concrete [licence] proposals are also required does not
mean it is relevant to ask if those proposals are actually FRAND or not”;
Unwired Planet v Huawei, para. 744.
133 LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14; LG Düsseldorf, 31
March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 126/14; LG Mannheim, 27 November 2015
– Case No. 2 O 106/14; LG Mannheim, 8 January 2016 – Case No. 7 O
96/14.
134 Cf. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016, 4a O 73/14 – Saint Lawrence/
Vodafone, para. 228; LG Düsseldorf, 31 March2016, 4a O 126/14 – Saint
Lawrence/Vodafone, para. 222.
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 Licences previously concluded in the market (com-
parables) are amply discussed but the relevance of
particular comparables (or non-comparables) is also
critically scrutinized. The reluctance of the court to
consider comparables stemming from arbitration
runs somewhat contrary to the important role that
Alternative Dispute Resolution is intended135 to play
in the future European SEP/FRAND landscape. It
may, in future cases, be overcome by revealing to the
respective state court the arbitration tribunal’s rea-
soning underlying the award. When defining – as the
decision does – specific royalty rates for particular
regions (e.g. China), courts should be careful to
avoid unjustified multiple discounts. If, for instance,
a worldwide royalty rate already includes a discount
for regions that are covered only by a relatively weak
portfolio of the patentee, a specific, further discount
rate for these regions may end up in too much of a
rebate.
 It is noteworthy but not self-evident that the court fa-
vours a calculation of damages based on the revenues
from a hypothetical licence at FRAND level. Part of
the German case-law has, so far, taken a different po-
sition by limiting damages to FRAND level only for
the period of time after the patentee’s failure to com-
ply with the Huawei v. ZTE requirements while allow-
ing for the skimming of the implementer’s/infringer’s
profits for the period of time during which the paten-
tee was in compliance with Huawei v. ZTE.136
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135 CJEU, 16 July 2015, C-170/13 – Huawei v. ZTE, para. 68; cf. also Art. 35
UPCA regarding the creation of a UPC Centre for Mediation and
Arbitration.
136 LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016, 4b O 120/14 – Unwired Planet/Samsung;
LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016, 4b O 122/14 – Unwired Planet/Samsung;
LG Düsseldorf, 19 January 2016, 4b O 123/14 – Unwired Planet/Samsung.
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